Why Are Botnets So Difficult To Stop?
Definition: a "botnet" is commonly known as a network of infected computers used to send spam (among other actions).
The largest botnets contain hundred of thousands of "zombie" machines controlled by a "bot herder," who uses sophisticated encryption, infection and peer-to-peer (P2P) networking techniques to ensure the permanence and growth of the botnet. As the zombies are used, they become discovered and subsequently blocked. While individual zombies are constantly changing, the overall botnet and people who control them remain the same.
Because of botnets, spam does not come from a predictable set of computers rather, it comes from all over the place in a completely unpredictable manner. By leveraging the diversity of IP addresses available via botnets, spammers have rendered the blocking approach far less effective than it once was.
Further, as the number of broadband subscribers continues to grow most rapidly in developing economies such as China and Eastern Europe the number of computers available to exploit for participation in botnets is expanding. As botnets increase in size and sophistication, trying to identify where the "bad stuff" is coming from is becoming less and less worthwhile.
Indeed, researchers at Georgia Tech discovered in 2006 in a survey of data from the Spamhaus black list that only 5 per cent of botnet IP addresses ever end up listed in the Spamhaus database. In another paper, the same researchers found that 85 per cent of spam zombies sent fewer than ten email messages to their honeypot server over the course of about 18 months, as shown in the above graph.
Example: A Transient Zombie
In late 2007, the zombie at 201.21.174.207 (a Brazilian broadband subscriber address) began sending approximately three spams each day into one of our honey pot systems. It took 19 days for the first real-time blackhole list (RBL) to identify this IP address and cause it to be blocked. By sending only a very light trickle of email, zombies can evade detection.
While blocking continues to be a core component of the multi-layered anti-spam architecture, it makes little sense in 2008 to depend on filtering technology designed to block spam in 2001 before the advent of botnets. Approaches that seek to block spam fail to deal with the issue of unknown senders.
NEXT: Post #6 Blocking Spam in 2008
PREVIOUS: Post #4 Spamonomics: The Economics of Spamming
Friday, April 18, 2008
Post #5 on Why Spam Filters Suck "trickle blog" series
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Desmond Liao
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Labels: anti-spam, botnets, DSNBLs, Georgia Tech, IP-addresses, P2P, rbl, spam, unknown senders, zombie
Friday, April 11, 2008
Post #4 on Why Spam Filters Suck "trickle blog" series
"Spamonomics": The Economics of Spamming
Spammers earn billions of dollars annually. The business is efficient, hierarchical, and organized. In much the same way that the global trade in narcotics involves every conceivable method of smuggling (from submarines to drug mules), the spam trade employs software engineers to develop increasingly sophisticated delivery technologies. Just as the drug trade will continue until the end of humanity, so too will the illegal delivery of spam.
To understand how spamming has become such an intractable problem, it serves to analyze the economics that drive spamming. Spammers make money if one in every 30,000 recipients makes a purchase. And given this response rate, a spammer advertising pharmaceutical products can expect to make roughly $5,000 per million email messages sent.
Finding out what it costs to send spam is not difficult: Botnet operators advertise their spamming services via online forums. One forum mentioned a price of $100 to send one million spam messages. If we assume that $100 is the cost per million spam messages, and $5,000 is the revenue, then the gross margin from spamming is approximately 98 percent.
Although some spam filters provide better accuracy than others, filter accuracy across the board is approximately 90 per cent, meaning that only one in ten spam messages reach a recipient. If global anti-spam effectiveness could be improved from 90 to 95 per cent, earning $5,000 from spamming would require sending 2 million spam messages, rather than 1 million. This increase in volume would reduce the spammers’ profit margin from 98 per cent to 96 per cent assuming sending costs remained constant. If global anti-spam accuracy reaches 99 per cent -- a figure that experts will tell you is nearly inconceivable given the innovative methods of spammers -- sending costs would reduce spamming margin to 80 per cent. Google is one of the world’s most profitable advertising companies with a margin of 25 per cent -- imagine 80 per cent? This is a business that won’t be going away any time soon.
Before botnets arrived, spammers could be stopped by blocking their IP addresses. DNSBLs like Spamhaus and Habeas block between 60-70%. With the introduction of botnets, blocking no longer provides a sufficient solution to the spam problem.
NEXT: Post #5 Why Are Botnets So Difficult To Stop?
PREVIOUS: Post #3 Final Ultimate Solution to the Spam Problem (FUSSP)
Posted by
Desmond Liao
at
11:26 AM
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Labels: accuracy, anti-spam, botnets, DSNBLs, economics, google, Habeas, IP-addresses, profit, spam, spamhaus, spamonomics









